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Firm investment and credit constraints in India, 1997-2006: 
A stochastic frontier approach 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
We use the stochastic frontier approach to estimate the impact of firm characteristics on investment 
decisions of Indian firms during the 1997-2006 period. The use of the stochastic frontier approach 
allows us to define the (unobserved) optimum investment that is consistent with a firm‟s 
characteristics such as the Tobin‟s q during each firm-year, and then estimate the deviation from this 
unobserved optimum in the form of an (investment) efficiency score that varies between zero and one. 
This deviation is interpreted as the degree of credit constraint, and we are also able to estimate the 
impact of firm characteristics such as leverage and business group affiliation on the degree of credit 
constraint via their marginal effects. Our results suggest that the degree of credit constraint of an 
average firm increased over time during the sample period, despite significant reforms of the Indian 
banking sector by the turn of the century. We also find that the degree of credit constraint decreases 
with cash flow and assets, which is consistent with the available literature. Further, there is a threshold 
effect of leverage, and the degree of credit constraint is greater for highly leveraged firms. Finally, we 
find that the beneficial impact of business group affiliation on the degree of credit constraint decreases 
over time, and is eliminated by the end of the sample period.  
 
 
Keywords: Investment, Credit rationing, Imperfect information, Stochastic frontier analysis 
JEL classifications: C23, C24, D82, D92, G31, G32 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between investment and economic growth is well understood. In the context of 
emerging market economies like India, research has therefore focussed on factors that might inhibit 
firm-level investment. This has led to discussions about policies aimed at ending financial repression 
that is associated with government-influenced disbursal of credit and underdeveloped capital markets 
(Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005). A natural extension of this discussion is the debate about the 
pre-emption of private investment in India by the presence of a large (and presumably less efficient) 
public sector (Majumdar, 2009). 
 The literature demonstrates awareness of the fact that in emerging markets financial 
liberalisation and gradual withdrawal of the public sector from production of goods and services (at 
least in a relative sense) may not be a panacea for private firms. Research has highlighted the risk 
aversion of banks which enjoy greater autonomy in the aftermath of financial liberalisation but are 
also subject to prudential regulation that penalise risky lending. Bhaumik and Piesse (2008) 
demonstrate that such risk aversion is also evident in the behaviour of public sector banks. Newly 
autonomous banks, especially those in the public sector, are also hampered by their inability to make 
judgements about the quality of potential borrowers. Hence, they undertake rule-based lending that 
awards credit based on sales, rather than on expected profitability or returns on the investment 
(Banerjee, Cole and Duflo, 2006). Finally, corruption and political intervention might lead to 
diversion of credit to politically connected firms, presumably at the expense of other (perhaps even 
more efficient and profitable) firms (Khwaja and Mian, 2006). 
 However, a literature that analyses the problem of credit constraint (or, more generally, 
frictions obstructing access to emerging capital/credit markets) on investment from the firms‟ point of 
view is still rather small. Most of the existing literature on emerging markets focuses on the impact of 
financial liberalisation on firm investment: Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) for Indonesia; 
Guncavdi, Bleaney and McKay (1998) for Turkey; Gelos and Werner (2002) for Mexico; Wang 
(2003) for Taiwan, and Koo and Maeng (2005) for South Korea. In general, the existing research 
concur that financial liberalisation eases financial constraints of firms. However, this may not be true 
for all firms. Gelos and Werner (2002) find that financial liberalisation eased credit constraints for 
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smaller Mexican firms but not their larger counterparts. They also find that banks rely on collateral to 
a significant extent. Wang (2003) too finds that smaller firms in Taiwan benefit more from financial 
liberalisation than larger firms. Ganesh-Kumar, Sen and Vaidya (2001) focus on overall economic 
liberalisation instead, and find that firms with more outward orientation, measured by the export 
intensity of their sales, are less constrained in the financial markets. 
 In this paper, we examine the nature of credit constraints among manufacturing sector firms 
from India, for the 1997-2007 period.
1
 India has witnessed progressive liberalisation of its real sector 
since 1985 and its financial sector since 1992. By the second half of the 1990s, the banks enjoyed a 
fair degree of autonomy (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008), and the equity market was growing rapidly 
(Shah and Thomas, 1997). Correspondingly, the post-1991 period witnessed significant growth in 
both credit and private sector investment.
2
 The net outstanding credit to the industrial sector rose from 
INR 578.6 billion in 1993-94 to INR 3408.9 billion in 2008-09, in real terms, recording an annual 
average growth rate of 11 percent. However, because of the implementation of stricter prudential 
norms banks have been holding government securities over and above the prescribed minimum 
requirement. This has resulted to lower credit growth than what would have been consistent with a 
higher rate of growth in the real sector (Marjit and Das, 2008). The average annual growth rate of 
private investment for (roughly) the corresponding period was 17.77 percent. Yet, even during the 
second half of the last decade, there was prima facie evidence of credit constraints inhibiting 
investment growth at the firm level (Chaudhuri, Koudal and Sheshadri, 2009). The country therefore 
provides an excellent setting for an empirical examination of the factors that affect firm-level 
investment in the presence of capital/credit market imperfections and agency conflicts. 
 We adopt the stochastic frontier approach as a tool to address the above mentioned problem. 
This approach, which is widely used in the production efficiency literature, is well suited to address 
our problem in which the outcome variable (desired or optimum investment) has a natural maximum 
                                                   
1 We do not include data for 2008 and 2007 in our sample to exclude the period of global financial crisis from 
our sample. While India was not significantly affected by the crisis, there was, nevertheless, a noticeable drop in 
the country‟s GDP growth rate, implying a possible change in its business environment. 
2 Resources mobilised through capital market continue to account for less than 3 percent of GDP. By contrast, 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector rose from 44.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to 64.2 percent of GDP 
in 2007. By all accounts, India remains a bank based economy. 
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which is unobserved, such that the observed value of the outcome variable is less than its desired 
(maximum) value. Thus, the idea is to estimate the unobserved maximum value econometrically using 
actual data on the outcome variable and some covariates, and thereby compute the shortfall of 
investment due to credit constraint for every firm and for every year of the period of analysis. This 
„shortfall‟ can be used to define a measure of investment efficiency that is bounded between 0 and 1, 
so that the frontier is attained when the efficiency is 1. This efficiency score tells us the degree of 
credit constraint for each firm and for every year. Importantly, this measure reflects the impact of all 
the factors (observed as well as unobserved) that inhibit attaining the investment frontier, ceteris 
paribus.  Subsequently, we are able to directly estimate the marginal impact of (observed) factors that 
constrain investment on this efficiency measure. These marginal effects provide a better 
understanding of the underlying drivers of credit constraints. In particular, policymakers can better 
understand not only whether policies such as those used for financial sector liberalisation improve 
efficiency over time, but also whether these policies have differential impact on firms based on 
characteristics such as size. At the same time, firms themselves develop a better idea about factors 
that can reduce their credit constraints, thereby giving them a strategic direction.  
 Our results suggest that, in keeping with the existing literature in firm-level investments, 
credit constraints are alleviated by cash flows and (log) assets of firms. The degree of credit constraint 
is higher for highly leveraged firms. The literature suggests that these indicate the presence of adverse 
selection in the Indian credit market. We also find that business groups alleviate credit constraints for 
member firms, but their ability to do so has declined over time. However, evidence suggests that 
while the effectiveness of business group membership itself for alleviating credit constraints was 
declining over time, business groups were also restructuring in ways that gave them an overall 
advantage vis-a-vis non-members. Overall, there is a decline in median investment efficiency of the 
firms over the sample period, when investment efficiency refers to the ability a firm to translate 
characteristics such as its Tobin‟s q ratio and sales-to-capital ratio into investment. But, even the 
marginal impact of business group membership weakens over time, the median investment efficiency 
of business group members increases relative to non-members over the same period.  
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 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on 
the determinants of firm-level investment, one that is focussed almost entirely on developed 
industrialised economies. In Section 3, we draw on the above literature to construct the empirical 
methodology, emphasising the stochastic frontier approach that distinguishes between drivers of 
investment in the absence of market imperfections and agency problems, and factors that generate the 
aforesaid frictions for capital/credit market access. This section also briefly discusses the data. The 
regression results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A brief review of the literature 
Following the arguments of James Tobin, it is stylised that in a world without capital market 
imperfections and taxes, the investment of a firm that maximises its net worth will depend on its 
Tobin‟s q (Yoshikawa, 1980). The “q” theory posits that if a firm‟s investment strategies are 
fundamentally sound then investors‟ valuation of the firm would be higher than the cost of the assets 
required to undertake production. Hence, if a firm‟s q – the ratio of the market value of its assets to 
the replacement cost of these assets – is greater than 1 then the firm would be encouraged to invest 
further, while a value of q that is less than 1 would discourage investment. 
 This basic model about the determinant of investment has been extended in a number of 
ways. To begin with, recent studies have taken into consideration the possibility that investment 
decisions may be affected by the demand for a firm‟s output. In such cases, there is a departure from 
Hayashi‟s (1982) argument that under plausible circumstances the marginal q used in Tobin‟s analysis 
and the more readily observable average q are identical;
 3 investment depends on output as well. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, early attempts at empirical estimation of investment functions find that, along 
with (average) q, the output level of firms have statistically significant coefficients (Abel, 1980). This 
statistically significant relationship is confirmed by more recent studies (Blundell et al., 1992; 
Cuthbertson and Gasparro, 1995).  
                                                   
3 Hayashi (1982) demonstrates that for a price taking firm in both the product and factor markets, with a linear 
homogeneous technology and linear homogeneous adjustment cost of capital, marginal q equals average q. 
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 It was further recognised that since capital markets are prone to failures on account of 
informational imperfections (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), it is important to take into account the factors 
that determine whether or not a firm is finance constrained. Initially, the literature focussed on the 
internal resources of the firms, with cash flows as a proxy for internal resources. Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) include the firms‟ cash flows in the specification, and argue that a statistically 
significant (and positive) coefficient for the cash flow variable indicates the presence of financing 
constraints.4 The significance (and positive sign) of the coefficient for the cash flow variable is borne 
out by a number of empirical studies (e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994; Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; 
Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick, 1998).
5
  
 It is easy to see that possibility of capital market failure on account of informational 
imperfections has other implications for a firm‟s investment. Following Bester (1985) and Besanko 
and Thakor (1987), it is possible to argue that a firm can overcome financial constraints by posting 
collateral. An implication of this argument is that smaller firms that have less collateral to post are 
likely to be more credit constrained than larger firms. This is largely borne out by the available 
empirical evidence (Audretsch and Elston, 2002; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006).6 
 The literature also suggests that the impact of capital market failure on investment can be 
reduced by organisational structures such as business groups. This could be, as in the case of Japan, 
on account of access to banks that are an integral part of these groups (Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein, 1991). Alternatively, this could be on account of internal capital markets that are 
generally associated with business groups such as the Korean chaebols (Shin and Park, 1999). 
                                                   
4 Hubbard (1998) demonstrates that an increase in cash flows, which can be a proxy for an increase in net worth 
of the firm, leads to an increase in the optimal level of capital, given any cost of capital. Alternatively, it signals 
a reduction in internal agency problems, especially moral hazard, and hence reduces the (shadow) cost of 
capital.   
5 It has been argued that a significant coefficient of the cash flow variable does not necessarily indicate presence 
of a financial constraint. If a firm has the ability to maintain investment in fixed capital by adjusting working 
capital, the coefficient of the cash flow variable would capture shifts in investment demand. One implication of 
this line of argument is that reduced form models underestimate the impact of financial constraints on 
investment (see Fazzari and Petersen, 1993, for details). Some studies have, therefore, used cash holding of 
firms instead of cash flow (Denis and Siblikov, 2010). However, the use of cash flow in empirical 
specifications, and the use of its estimated coefficients to draw inferences about financial constraint experienced 
by firms are stylised in the literature. 
6  Audretsch and Elston (2002) demonstrate that, in Germany, on account of the financial infrastructure to 
support small firms, it is the medium sized firms that are most credit constrained. But in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, in keeping with the prediction, the smaller firms are more credit constrained. 
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 Later research takes into consideration the impact of one other source of friction, namely, 
agency conflict within firms. Following Myers (1977), who notes that debt creates an agency conflict 
by ensuring that at least a part of the returns from an investment accrues to debt holders rather than 
share holders, it is argued that managers in highly leveraged firms have less incentive to exploit 
opportunities for growth and profitable investment. However, while high leverage can be a proxy for 
agency conflict within a firm, it is also a proxy for financial constraint (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007). 
Hence, as is the case of cash flows, the exact implication of a statistically significant (and negative) 
coefficient for leverage is not necessarily clear. 
 In sum, the literature on firm-level investment posits that in a world characterised by perfect 
capital market and no agency conflicts, investment would depend on Tobin‟s q and output, the latter a 
proxy for demand constraint. Once agency conflicts and informational imperfections are introduced, 
there can be underinvestment on account of paucity of cash flows (a proxy for both optimal/desired 
capital stock and agency conflict), firm size (a proxy for collateral), leverage (a proxy for both agency 
conflict and financial constraint), and, in certain contexts, absence of organisational structures such as 
business groups. We discuss the implications of this for our empirical methodology in the next 
section. 
 
3. Empirical strategy and data 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
As mentioned earlier, the literature on investment decisions of firms builds on the work of Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988), who use Value Line data for 422 large U.S. manufacturing firms over 
the 1970-84 period. If a value maximizing firm is not financially constrained, its investment decisions 
depend only on their future prospect, which is captured by Tobin‟s q. 7 As discussed earlier, it might 
also be affected by current and past sales. However, if the firm is finance constrained, its investment 
is also affected by cash flow that is a proxy for internal resources. In the tradition of the literature we 
characterise the regression model as follows:  
                                                   
7 For a discussion of the optimisation problem of a value-maximising firm that underpins this specification, see 
Hubbard (1998).  
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where I is investment, X is vector of variables that captures investment opportunities, CF is cash flow, 
K is capital, and ε is the independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise term. In light of our 
earlier discussion, it is obvious that the components of vector X are Tobin‟s q and present and lagged 
values of sales. 
Equation [1] is generally extended, as required, to examine the impact of factors over and 
above cash flow that can capture frictions in the capital market on investment levels. For example, 
Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005) examine the impact of leverage on firm investment in Canada using the 
following regression model: 
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where θ and μ capture time and firm fixed effects, and ε is the i.i.d error term. As in the case of [1], if 
the cash flow and leverage coefficients in above regressions are found to be statistically significant, 
one might argue that firms are finance constrained. While Aivazian et al. (2005) use panel regression 
models for estimation, some researchers use pooled (ordinary least squares) regression to estimate the 
model (Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 1996). 
In much of the literature, the sample of firms is classified into groups that have differential 
cost of information, and hence different likelihoods of being financially constrained, on the basis of 
some criterion. The differences in sensitivity of investment to internal resources (i.e., cash flows) for 
these groups capture the differences in the extent of credit constraint. The Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) paper classified firms on the basis of their dividend payouts, while other studies have 
used firm characteristics such as size and age. While the basis for the chosen criteria are plausible, it 
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is nevertheless ad hoc, especially when the criteria are potentially time varying. Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) showed that the cash flow sensitivity to investment could lead to erroneous conclusion when 
firms are classified into groups of high or low costs of information by dividend pay-out or any other 
criterion. As discussed in Laeven (2003), a priori classification of firms into groups using other 
criteria might lead to erroneous conclusion as well. 
 The stochastic frontier approach provides a better way of testing the presence of constraints in 
the investment function and examining the impact of the constraining variables in investment. Wang 
(2003) argues that in the absence of agency conflicts and capital market imperfections a firm‟s 
investment decision is defined as follows: 
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where θ, μ and ε have the same interpretation as above. This regression model, therefore, defines the 
efficient investment function (frontier). In the presence of financing constraints, the observed 
investment-to-capital ratio will be less than the efficient (optimal) investment-to-capital ratio in [3]. 
Thus, the difference between this efficient investment-to-capital ratio and the observed investment-to-
capital ratio will be attributed to financing constraint. This difference can be represented by a non-
negative term u. More specifically, we write the observed investment-to-capital ratio as:  
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 Models [3] and [4] together define the stochastic frontier formulation of the investment 
function. The above model can be estimated using distributional assumptions on u and ε.8 It gives not 
only the estimates of the parameters of the investment function but observation-specific estimates of u 
as well. The first (and perhaps the main) advantage of the stochastic frontier approach is that the 
                                                   
8  In stochastic production frontier models (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000), the frontier function usually 
represents the production function and the u term represents technical inefficiency. The model estimates both 
the parameters and technical inefficiency. 
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estimated (non-negative) values of u can tell us not only whether a firm is constrained, but also the 
degree (severity) of its constraint. The higher the value of u greater is the impact of constraints on 
investment. If u is close to zero for some firms we can say that that those firms are not constrained. 
Thus in the present case, the frontier represents the desired/optimum investment function which is 
unobserved and the u term represents a firm‟s inability to attain the investment frontier, ceteris 
paribus, due to the presence of financing constraints.  
In other words, the main advantage of the stochastic frontier approach is its ability to compute 
a technical efficiency score for each firm and for each year of the sample period, technical efficiency 
being a measure of the extent to which a firm is successful in mitigating credit constraints. More 
specifically, technical efficiency will be investment efficiency defined as the ratio of actual to the 
efficient investment (i.e., exp(-u) which will be bounded between 0 and 1). Thus, for example, an 
efficiency score of 0.8 indicates that the firm‟s investment is 80 percent of its desired level. The 
efficiency score will be estimated for each observation using the frontier technique. It is, therefore, 
possible to examine distributions of the extent of credit constraints of the firms from the efficiency 
scores. Aside from the ease of interpretation, the technical efficiency score has the advantage that it 
captures the combined impact of all the constraining variables on the extent of credit constraint. By 
contrast, alternative methodologies such as OLS or fixed effects panel data models captures the 
marginal impact of individual Z variables on investment alone, and hence do not tell us whether or not 
a firm is credit constrained overall, and if so by how much.
9
 The technical efficiency score also 
enables us to identify whether certain types of firms are concentrated more in one of the tails of the 
distribution of the technical efficiency score – i.e., whether firms with certain characteristics are more 
likely to be credit constrained – or evenly spread along it, once again, without using any ad hoc 
criteria to split the sample. 
                                                   
9 This is because in models such as [1] and [2] the difference between the expected values of  ln(   /        with 
and without the Z variables might not be negative. A negative value for  
, 1 Z 0(ln( / ) | ) it i tE I K     
, 1 Z 0(ln( / ) | )it i tE I K   can be interpreted as percentage reduction in investment due to the presence of credit 
constraints (proxied by the Z variables). In other words, although one can show that firms are credit constrained 
from the marginal effects of the Z variables, it is not possible to quantify the degree of it. 
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 Another advantage of the stochastic frontier approach is that we can directly estimate the 
impact of firm characteristics (Z) such as size and leverage on the degree of credit constraint, once 
again, without splitting the sample in any ad hoc manner. This can be done by extending the basic 
model proposed above to accommodate the Z variables. We accommodate these variables into the 
model via the inefficiency term, i.e., we now assume that           
              where 
                    to maintain non-negativity. Furthermore, we specify       as 
 
' itZ    
    
      
                                    
 
                               [5] 
 
where LOGASSET is the logarithm of physical assets (a proxy for ability to post collateral), 
LEVERAGE (the debt-to-equity ratio) is a measure of the firm‟s financial fragility, GROUP is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm belongs to a business group, and TIMETREND is 
a variable that has the value one for the first year of the sample period and increases by one for each 
subsequent year in the sample period. The interaction term involving the group membership dummy 
and the time trend variable captures the changing impact of business group membership on a firm‟s 
credit constraint over time. Finally,  is the parameter vector associated with these variables. 
In essence, we argue that the factors restricting access to capital and credit markets are 
inability to post collateral and financial fragility. Internal cash flows allow the firm to mitigate the 
financial constraints. Ability to access external finance increases with a firm‟s stock of assets that can 
be posted as collateral, and is adversely affected by high leverage. Finally, we posit that membership 
of business groups can alleviate credit constraints as well, even though the ability of business groups 
to alleviate credit constraints might change over time. As discussed earlier in the paper, the choice of 
these constraining variables is perfectly consistent with the literature on firm investment decisions. 
To summarise, if one estimates the investment frontier in [3], the estimated values of u will 
show which firm is investing less and by how much due to the presence of constraints. In [5] we go 
one step further and assume that investment inefficiency can be explained in terms of the Z variables. 
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In the above specification                                   and hence we can easily find 
the marginal effect of the Z variables on investment inefficiency. If a Z variable lowers u (i.e., relaxes 
the financing constraint), the marginal effect will tell us by what percent investment will increase if a 
Z variable is increased by one percent. Hence, aside from offering the aforementioned advantages 
over OLS and fixed effects panel data approaches, the stochastic frontier approach also allows us to 
estimate marginal impact of Z variables, in much the same way as the alternative approaches. 
Indeed, it can be argued that (variations of) the specification used in the OLS and fixed effects 
panel approaches are a special case of the stochastic frontier model. Consider, for example, the 
following variation of [1] which includes the Z variables enumerated in [5]: 
 
   
   
      
                  
       
      
       
         
      
    
    
      
                
                                                        [6] 
 
Next, consider the stochastic formulation of the baseline equation: 
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If we denote            , it is clear that     will have a non-zero mean because     is non-negative, 
and this poses a problem in using OLS (which will assume zero mean error). This non-zero mean 
problem can be avoided by rewriting     as                                
         
where      
     by construction. We then get an error term that has a zero mean but need to account 
for the extra term –       in the regression. If we assume that  
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then we get back [6]. Thus, we can justify the use of [6] starting from a frontier model. The advantage 
of using [7] is that the distributional assumptions about u and v in the stochastic frontier model 
guarantees that –        , thereby shedding light on the extent of credit constraint of a firm in each 
of the years of analysis. As discussed earlier in this section, the traditional approaches based on OLS 
and fixed effects panel models do not offer this advantage. 
We use a combination of these methodologies to examine the nature of credit constraints 
among our sample of firms. Our base model is given by [7], which we estimate using OLS, fixed 
effects panel model and the stochastic frontier approach.
10
 We then extend the model gradually to 
account for factors that can affect a firm‟s credit constraint, i.e., the Z variables. Our extended 
specification for the OLS and fixed effects panel model is given by [6] while the extended stochastic 
frontier specification is given by [7] and [7a]. From the earlier discussion about the likely impact of 
the Z variables, it is evident therefore that expected signs of the coefficients of the Z variables are as 
follows: 
 
 Pooled OLS Panel fixed 
effects 
Stochastic  
frontier 
Cash flows + + - 
(Log) assets + + - 
Leverage - - + 
Business group membership + + -  
Business group membership 
× Time trend   
? ? ? 
 
 
3.2 Data 
We estimate the OLS, panel data, and stochastic frontier models using firm-level data from the Indian 
manufacturing sector. Our sample includes a set of 598 Indian private manufacturing firms 
                                                   
10 The OLS and fixed effects panel models, of course, include only the i.i.d. ε term, not the u inefficiency term. 
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incorporated prior to 1991. We focus on private firms which, unlike many state-owned firms, do not 
have soft budget constraints on account of access to the public purse (see Majumdar, 1998), and, even 
though some of the firms have foreign equity participation, they do not have access to global capital 
market. Our sample of firms are largely dependent on the local credit market to finance their 
investments which is quite representative for not just Indian firms but privately owned firms in nearly 
all emerging markets. The choice of firms that were incorporated before 1991 ensures that all the 
firms in the same had time to develop banking relationships well before the sample period of 1997-
2006. Our results should therefore not be influenced by a sub-sample of new firms that are credit 
constrained on account of weak banking relationships. Finally, the choice of manufacturing firms 
alone is consistent with a wide range of empirical analyses that do not pool together manufacturing 
and services sector firms that are different in many ways.  
Data on these firms are obtained from the widely used Prowess database marketed by the 
Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess provides balance sheets and profit and 
loss accounts of firms in a standardised format, making the numbers comparable across the firms. 
Data on variables such as sales, capital, investments and cash flows can therefore be directly obtained 
from the database or easily computed. Prowess also provides information on financial ratios such as 
the debt-to-equity ratio that is our measure of leverage or financial fragility, as well as information on 
business group affiliations Our definition of variables is consistent with the existing literature. 
 
INSERT Table 1 here. 
 
 In Table 1, we report the summary statistics of the variables we use in our regression models. 
The figures are self-explanatory, and only one variable needs further explanation. We discovered 
through experimentation that the debt-to-equity ratio of firms, our measure of leverage, does not have 
an impact on investment decisions or the aforesaid inefficiency when it is used in the relevant 
regression specification in linear and quadratic forms. This is not surprising; a change in the leverage 
from (say) 0.2 to 0.3 may not have any impact on a firm‟s ability to borrow, but an increase from 1.6 
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to 1.7 might have a significant impact.11 Indeed evidence suggests that leverage has a threshold effect 
on credit ratings (Becker and Milbourn, 2008). Hence, as a proxy for leverage, we used a dummy 
variable that takes the value one when the leverage is high, and zero otherwise. Experimentation with 
the threshold suggests that leverage adds to financial constraint for threshold values of debt-to-equity 
ratio beyond 1.6. When the threshold of 1.6 is used, the coefficient of the high-leverage dummy 
variable is significant at the 10 percent level. The statistical significance of the coefficient improves as 
the threshold is raised, and it becomes significant at the 1 percent level for threshold values of 1.8 or 
more. We, therefore, use the cut-off value of 1.8 for our estimation. In our sample, sixteen percent of 
the firms reported high leverage. 
 
4. Regression results and discussion 
The regression results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2, we report the OLS estimates and 
estimates of the panel fixed effects model. For each of these models, we progressively introduce the 
factors that determine investment in contexts without agency conflicts and market imperfections 
(Columns 1 and 4), the much discussed cash flow and (log) asset variables that capture a firm‟s ability 
to mitigate credit constraints (Columns 2 and 5), and the less discussed leverage and business group 
membership variables that also affect a firm‟s investment decisions (Columns 3 and 6). The F-
statistics and the R-squared values for the models are reported as well, and they indicate that the 
specifications are meaningful, and are a reasonably good fit for the data. 
 
INSERT Table 2 here. 
 
 In Table 3, we report the estimates of stochastic frontier models with fixed effects. The model 
in column (1) assumes that investment inefficiency u is i.i.d., 
2(0, ), 0u itN u   but does not attempt 
to explain this inefficiency. The models in columns (2) and (3) capture the impact of firm 
                                                   
11  This argument is not unique to this particular context. For example, while an increase in an investor‟s 
ownership from 10 percent of a company to 11 percent may not have any impact on the behaviour or 
performance of the company, an increase from 49 percent to 50 percent, which gives the investor outright 
control of the company, may have a significant impact (Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010). 
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characteristics on inefficiency. As in the case of the OLS and fixed effects panel models, we introduce 
the firm characteristics gradually. We include the cash flow and (log) assets variables in column (2), 
and add the leverage and business group membership variables in column (3).  
 
INSERT Table 3 here. 
 
 The regression results suggest that, as expected, Tobin‟s q and investment decisions are 
generally positively correlated. Current sales too always has a positive impact on investment, while 
sales lagged one period has a positive coefficient for the panel fixed effect model and most of the 
specifications of the stochastic model, but negative coefficients for the OLS models. As we have 
already noted, when sales accelerator is modelled as a function of current and past sales, some of the 
coefficients may be negative (Abel and Blanchard, 1989). Overall, wherever the sales lagged one 
period has a negative coefficient, the coefficient of the current sales variable is much larger, and it is 
reasonable to conclude that sales have a positive impact on investment decisions. 
 We now turn to the factors that alleviate or aggravate the friction in the capital and credit 
markets. The coefficients of these variables, reported in Tables 2 and 3, can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
 
Pooled OLS 
Panel fixed 
effects 
Stochastic 
frontier 
Cash flows  + - 
(Log) assets + + - 
Leverage - - + 
Business group membership +  - 
Business group membership 
× Time trend   
- - + 
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 It is easily seen than the signs of these coefficients are not only consistent with our 
expectations, but are also remarkably robust across estimation methodologies and specifications. 
Specifically, 
 Investment is positively correlated with cash flow; conversely, cash flow reduces credit 
constraints. This is consistent with the mainstream literature on firm level investments. 
 Similarly, investment (credit constraint) is positively (negatively) correlated with (log) assets, 
our proxy for access to collateral. This has significant implications for fast growing firms and 
service sector firms whose collaterisable assets may be small relative to their investment 
needs. 
 The extent of friction or credit constraint increases with a firm‟s leverage, signalling perhaps 
both prudence and risk aversion of the creditors and investors. This is consistent with the 
available evidence about the risk aversion of Indian banks (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008). 
 The pooled OLS and stochastic frontier estimates suggest that business group membership 
alleviates credit constraints, which is consistent with the stylised view about internal capital 
markets associated with these organisational structures. But the negative coefficient of the 
interaction term involving the time trend indicates that the advantages of belonging to a 
business group declines over time and disappears by the ninth or tenth year of the sample 
period, by the end of the first decade of this century. The panel fixed effects results suggest 
that business group membership aggravated credit constraints throughout the sample period. 
This is consistent with the argument that while business groups are an optimal response to 
market failures in various contexts, the disadvantages associated with their opaque structures 
and questionable corporate governance qualities, as well as resistance to change, might 
outweigh the advantages once economic reforms liberalise factor and product markets and 
reduce the difficulty in accessing resources (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). This result is 
also consistent with that of Borensztein and Lee (2000), who found that subsequent to the 
financial crisis in South Korea in 1997, the chaebol affiliated firms lost their advantage with 
respect to access to credit. 
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INSERT Table 4 here. 
 
The marginal effects for cash flow and (log) assets variables are reported in Table 4. We 
report the marginal effects of these constraining factors for the 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles 
of their respective distributions. We do not generate marginal effects of the other variables that are 
binary zero-one indicators of leverage and business group membership. The marginal effects suggest 
that while cash flow and (log) assets reduce inefficiency, i.e., alleviate credit constraints for firms at 
all points of their distributions, the marginal impact of both these variables is much higher for firms 
that are at the lower tails of these distributions. For example, cash flow has a marginal effect of -
0.0016 for firms at the 90
th
 percentile of the distribution, but this marginal effect doubles to -0.0032 
for firms that are at the 10
th
 percentile of the distribution. Similarly, the marginal effects of (log) 
assets for the corresponding percentile levels of its distribution are -0.1062 and -0.2104, respectively. 
We undertake three other robustness checks for our estimation. First, we recognize the fact 
that in India long term debt often accounts for a greater proportion of assets than equity. This is 
especially true for older firms, a lot of whose assets were acquired prior to the growth of the Indian 
equity market. Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), we replace the usual measure of 
Tobin‟s q with one that takes into account long term debt, i.e., our new measure of Tobin‟s q is the 
ratio of the sum of the value of equity and long term debt to the replacement cost of these assets. 
Second, we take into account the possibility that, aside from Tobin‟s q and expected sales, investment 
decisions can be affected by uncertainty (Pindyck, 1991). We use as our proxy for a firm‟s uncertainty 
during a given year the variance of stock returns of that firm during that year (Leahy and Whited, 
1996; Bulan, 2005). Finally, we replace the debt-to-equity ratio by another measure of financial 
distress, namely, the solvency ratio.
12
 The choice of solvency ratio as a proxy for financial fragility is 
consistent with the research of Peat (2003) and Gryglewicz (2010). However, none of these changes 
                                                   
12 Solvency ratio is defined as the ratio of after tax profit plus depreciation to long term liabilities plus short term 
liabilities and can be used as a measure of the ability of the firm to meet debt obligations. It is, therefore, a proxy 
for financial fragility. 
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affects our results. We, therefore, do not report the coefficient estimates associated with these new 
specifications. 
 
INSERT Figures 1-3 here. 
 
 Next, we generate firm- and year-specific measures of technical (investment) efficiency from 
our stochastic frontier models. To recapitulate, the technical efficiency measure is bounded in (0, 1), 
with values close to zero indicating a high degree of credit constraint and values close to one 
indicating very little credit constraint. In order to understand how financial liberalisation and 
associated corporate restructuring have affected credit constraints of Indian firms, in Figures 1-3 we 
report the distributions of firm-specific technical efficiency for 1997 and 2006. Figure 1 suggests that 
while larger firms (in the top quartile of size distribution) were less credit constrained than the smaller 
firms (in the bottom quartile of the size distribution) in 1997 – distribution of technical efficiency of 
larger firms shifted to the right of the corresponding distribution for smaller firms – by 2006 the 
difference between the two types of firms had largely disappeared. Similarly, Figure 3 suggests that 
while highly indebted firms (those with debt-to-equity ratio higher than 1.8) were more credit 
constrained than firms with lower level of indebtedness (debt-to-equity ratio less than 1.8) in 1997, 
any remaining difference is not discernible from the distributions for 2006. However, it is difficult to 
detect patterns from Figure 2 which graphs the technical efficiency of business group members and 
non-members. 
 
INSERT Table 5 here. 
 
 In Table 5, we report the means and medians of the distributions plotted in Figures 1-3. It is 
easily seen that the contrast between technical efficiency of larger and smaller firms, and firms with 
and without a high level of indebtedness was sharper in 1997 than in 2006. By 2006, characteristics 
such as size and leverage were no longer sufficient to characterise the extent of credit constraints 
experienced by the firms; the differences in means and medians of the size and leverage classes was 
21 
 
negligible. As such, this would suggest that credit market imperfections were reduced by 2006; firms 
did not require credible signals in the form of assets and low leverage to access credit. At the same 
time, however, the mean and median technical efficiency of all types of firms were reduced between 
1997 and 2006. A plausible explanation for this is that firm-level demand for credit was rising faster 
than access to credit, as the fast growing economy opened up ever more opportunities for the firms. 
This explanation is consistent with the findings of Banerjee et al. (2005), namely, that banks in India 
determine credit in period t based on credit sanctioned in period t-1, without taking into consideration 
the growth potential of the firms. It is also consistent with the findings of Marjit and Das (2008).  
The summary measures of technical efficiency reported in Table 5 also have implications for 
corporate restructuring. Business group non-members had higher median (and mean) technical 
efficiency than their business group member counterparts in 1997, and by 2006 the difference in the 
median technical efficiency of business group members and non-members had widened further. The 
technical efficiency figures reported here suggest that as business group membership itself aggravated 
credit constraints for firms between 1997 and 2006, other characteristics of business group members 
did not change in a way that could offset this disadvantage. In other words, while business groups 
persist in the Indian corporate landscape, as in countries like South Korea (Boresnztein and Lee, 
2000), the rationale for forming business groups and sustaining corporate structures that incorporate 
them has weakened since the initiation of financial and other reforms in the early nineties.However, 
business groups may have other advantages (see Khanna and Palepu, 1999) that are not discussed in 
this paper. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we build on the literature on the related issues of firm investment and credit constraints 
experienced by firms during the process of investment. While there is a fairly large empirical 
literature on these issues in the context of developed countries, the literature on emerging market 
economies is relatively sparse. Our paper extends this literature to the context of India, where prima 
facie evidence points towards presence of credit constraints despite significant financial sector 
reforms since 1992. We adopt the stochastic frontier approach to empirical modelling of firms‟ 
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investment decisions, which has certain advantages over stylised approaches that use OLS and panel 
fixed effects models. 
 Our results suggest that, in keeping with the existing literature in firm-level investments, 
credit constraints are alleviated by cash flows and (log) assets of firms, and aggravated by a high 
leverage level. These results are consistent with the literature. We also find that business groups 
alleviate credit constraints for member firms, but their ability to do so has declined over time. Overall, 
there is a decline in median investment efficiency of the firms over the sample period, when 
investment efficiency refers to the ability a firm to translate characteristics such as its Tobin‟s q ratio 
and sales-to-capital ratio into investment. There was also a sharper decline in the median investment 
efficiency of business group members increases relative to non-members over the same period.  
 The decline in median investment efficiency of firms over our sample period has an important 
policy implication: financial reforms should ease credit constraints, not aggravate them. The next step, 
therefore, should be an examination of the post-1997 reforms on the lending behaviour of banks.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
   Mean 
  Standard 
  Deviation 
   
(Log) Tobin's q - 1.06   1.43 
   
(Log) Sales(t)/Capital(t-1)   0.31   0.90 
   
(Log) Sales(t-1)/Capital(t-2)   0.36   0.82 
   
Cash flow(t)/Capital(t-1)   2.25   2.21 
   
(Log) Assets   4.14   1.58 
   
Proportion of firms with high debt-to-
equity ratio 
  0.16   0.36 
   
Proportion of firms with business group 
membership 
  0.31   0.46 
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Table 2 
Preliminary regression results 
 Ordinary least squares Panel fixed effects 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
(Log) Tobin's q   0.11 ***   0.11 ***   0.04 **   0.13 ***   0.17 ***   0.12 *** 
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
(Log) Sales(t)/Capital(t-1)   0.71 ***   0.67 ***   0.67 ***   0.95 ***   0.46 ***   0.44 *** 
   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.05) 
(Log) Sales(t-1)/Capital(t-2) - 0.20 *** - 0.11 * - 0.17 ***   0.35 ***   0.54 ***   0.55 *** 
   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05) 
Cash flow(t)/Capital(t-1)    0.005   0.01   . 0.10 *** - 0.11 *** 
    (0.02)   (0.02)    (0.02)   (0.02) 
(Log) Assets    0.18 ***   0.17 ***    0.69 ***   0.74 *** 
    (0.02)   (0.01)    (0.04)   (0.04) 
High debt-to-equity ratio   - 0.30 ***   - 0.29 *** 
     (0.07)     (0.06) 
Business group membership     0.76 ***     0.23 
     (0.14)     (0.82) 
Time trend x Business group membership   - 0.07 ***   - 0.07 *** 
     (0.01)     (0.01) 
Constant - 3.08 *** - 3.88 *** - 3.82 *** - 3.28 *** - 6.25 *** - 6.32 *** 
   (0.04)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.03)   (0.19)   (0.32) 
             
           
F-statistic   139.42 ***   114.26 ***   71.62 ***   393.67 ***   302.88 ***   195.98 *** 
R-squared   0.17   0.21   0.19   0.15   0.17   0.13 
Number of firms   597   597   586   597   597   586 
Number of observations   4850   4850   4545   4850   4850   4545 
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Table 3 
Frontier regression models 
 Stochastic frontier model 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Frontier equation    
    
(Log) Tobin's q   0.11 ***   0.11 ***   0.06 *** 
   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
(Log) Sales(t)/Capital(t-1)   0.77 ***   0.81 ***   0.93 *** 
   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
(Log) Sales(t-1)/Capital(t-2) - 0.10 **   0.34 ***   0.38 *** 
   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03) 
Constant - 2.04 *** - 2.49 *** - 2.50 *** 
   (0.18)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
    
Inefficiency equation    
    
Cash flow(t)/Capital(t-1)  - 0.27 *** - 0.10 *** 
    (0.06)   (0.03) 
(Log) Assets  - 0.07 ** - 0.07 ** 
    (0.04)   (0.03) 
High debt-to-equity ratio     0.21 * 
     (0.13) 
Business group membership   - 0.62 ** 
     (0.30) 
Time trend x Business group membership     0.07 *** 
     (0.03) 
Constant  . 0.80 ***   0.58 *** 
    (0.18)   (0.18) 
    
    
Number of firms   597   597   586 
Number of observations   4850   4850   4545 
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Table 4 
Marginal effects of Z variables 
 (Z) variables explaining inefficiency 
Cash flow (Log) assets 
10
th
 percentile -0.0032 -0.2104 
25
th
 percentile -0.0027 -0.1771 
50
th
 percentile -0.0022 -0.1488 
75
th
 percentile -0.0018 -0.1243 
90
th
 percentile -0.0016 -0.1062 
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Fig. 1 
Impact of size 
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Fig. 2 
Impact of business group affiliation 
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Fig. 3 
Impact of indebtedness 
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Table 5 
Summary statistics for distribution of technical efficiency 
 1997 2006 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
Median Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
Median 
Firm size 
 
Smaller 
 
Larger 
 
 
0.54 
(0.14) 
0.62 
(0.11) 
 
 
0.54 
 
0.64 
 
 
0.50 
(0.20) 
0.53 
(0.15) 
 
 
0.56 
 
0.55 
Business group affiliation 
 
Affiliated 
 
Unaffiliated 
 
 
0.55 
(0.14) 
0.59 
(0.12) 
 
 
0.55 
 
0.59 
 
 
0.48 
(0.20) 
0.52 
(0.17) 
 
 
0.49 
 
0.56 
Indebtedness 
 
High 
 
Not high 
 
 
0.55 
(0.13) 
0.58 
(0.13) 
 
 
0.55 
 
0.60 
 
 
0.48 
(0.19) 
0.51 
(0.17) 
 
 
0.52 
 
0.55 
Note: Values within parentheses are standard deviations. 
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